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Introduction 
 
 
Fragile Alliances in Egypt’s Post-
Revolutionary Order 
The Military and Its Partners 
Chérine Chams El-Dine 
The election of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in May 2014 as Egypt’s President has ushered in a 
new order. The tacit alliance forged during the rule of Sisi’s predecessor, Mohammed 
Morsi, between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military had gradually eroded by the 
end of 2012. Currently, the military and the business elites constitute the core of an 
emerging tactical alliance, with the Salafist Nour party and secular political forces oc-
cupying a secondary position. In the mid-term, the consolidation of the post-July 2013 
order will depend first and foremost on the alliance’s capacity to ensure economic re-
covery. Secular and Islamist forces have each been forging electoral coalitions to try 
to win seats in the coming parliamentary elections, which are supposed to take place 
before the end of 2014. 
 
The ouster of President Mohamed Morsi on 
July 3, 2013, and the subsequent crackdown 
on the Muslim Brotherhood and its mem-
bers marked the official demise of an im-
plicit alliance between the military and the 
Brotherhood, which had characterized 
the beginning of Morsi’s presidency. Since 
then, a new order has been taking shape in 
Egypt, in which the military institution is 
occupying a central place. Sisi – who won 
the May 2014 elections with a landslide vic-
tory against the only rival, the leftist poli-
tician Hamdeen Sabahi – has granted the 
military the status of ultimate arbiter of 
the system and supervisor of Egypt’s new 
development projects, in addition to its 
classic role of national security custodian. 
The Military’s Increased Autonomy 
The 2014 constitution has made the mili-
tary an increasingly closed fiefdom, pro-
tecting its interests regardless of who fills 
the executive branch. According to it, the 
budget for the Armed Forces is exclusively 
discussed by the predominantly military 
National Defense Council (article 203). 
Similarly, the Armed Forces were particu-
larly keen on keeping the upper hand in 
military affairs and on being consulted on 
all national security matters. According 
to the constitution, the National Defense 
Council must be consulted by the President 
before declaring war or sending troops ab-
road, and it must also be consulted for draft 
laws related to the Armed Forces (articles 
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 152 and 203 respectively). The military also 
managed to impose article 204 to extend 
the scope of military trials of civilians in 
an unprecedented way. Moreover, a transi-
tional provision (article 234) stipulates that 
the appointment of the Defense Minister 
must be approved by the Supreme Com-
mand of the Armed Forces over the next 
two presidential terms. This strips the chief 
executive (i.e., the President) of his full au-
thority over the military – as the Supreme 
Commander of the Armed Forces – and en-
hances the institution’s autonomy. 
The Military and Egypt’s 
Mega Projects 
With a high budget deficit, reaching 12.6 
percent of Egypt’s GDP (as of 2013–2014 
pre-actual budget), soaring public debt, and 
growing unemployment, ensuring econom-
ic recovery – in terms of higher growth, in-
vestment, and thus employment rates – is 
imperative for Egypt’s new ruler. Since the 
January 2011 revolution, large business 
companies have been reluctant to invest 
their money in the country, as the political 
situation has remained unstable. Thus, fol-
lowing the demise of Morsi’s rule, the Egyp-
tian government and its Gulf allies – Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and 
Kuwait – have tried to improve economic 
development by investing large amounts in 
extensive infrastructure projects that could 
create jobs and boost the economy. In this 
context, the Armed Forces Engineering Au-
thority (AFEA) has been Egyptian officials’ 
most trusted entity for implementing such 
projects. 
Actually, the army’s involvement in civil-
ian infrastructure projects is far from a new 
practice. The Armed Forces started their ci-
vilian economic activities in the late 1970s 
with agrarian projects, land reclamation, 
and civilian public works contracts. They 
then gradually expanded and diversified 
their fields of activity through a multitude 
of income-generating enterprises, including 
construction, maritime transport, produc-
tion of petrochemicals, as well as environ-
mental projects such as wastewater treat-
ment and renewable energy. Thus, the pri-
vate sector and what is often called the 
military’s economic empire have coexisted 
for the last 30 years. Nonetheless, a clear 
division of labor has been respected by both 
parties, as some economic sectors were con-
sidered the bastions of big business, namely 
heavy industries (such as steel and iron), 
tourism, and telecommunications. 
Following Morsi’s ouster, the successive 
(interim) governments awarded the Minis-
try of Defense several contracts to carry out 
infrastructure projects through direct or-
der, i.e., without public tenders. These pro-
jects are to be implemented by the AFEA 
and range from building highways, bridges, 
and low-income housing to renovating pub-
lic hospitals. They also include the Suez 
Canal Area Development mega project. 
State officials justify their preference for 
the AFEA over private companies on the 
basis of the army engineering corps’ rapidi-
ty in implementing projects for the lowest 
cost and with the highest quality. Accord-
ing to a member of Sisi’s electoral campaign, 
the military would not crowd out the pri-
vate sector. This is partially true, as most of 
these projects are carried out by subcon-
tractors belonging to the private sector. The 
latter’s involvement is essential, as the im-
plementation of these projects goes beyond 
the AFEA’s own capabilities. However, this 
arrangement grants the military a 
supervisory role in these projects, and, a 
fortiori, over its private sector partners. 
Among Sisi’s foreign backers, the UAE 
has also been placing its trust in the AFEA. 
In October 2013, it signed a grant agree-
ment with the Egyptian government to 
finance a number of development projects 
in Egypt. The agreement stipulates that the 
UAE entrusts the Egyptian AFEA with super-
vising and/or implementing a number of 
these projects. This is in addition to two 
other projects signed by the Egyptian Minis-
try of Defense and UAE-based companies 
(Emaar Properties and Arabtec Holding) 
aimed at building a retail development 
and a low-income housing project. 
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 Business Elites: 
Indispensable Partners 
Yet, the intervention of the government 
and the Gulf sponsors to stimulate the 
economy provides only an ad hoc solution 
to a chronic issue. Economic recovery will 
basically depend on the regime’s ability to 
ensure political stability and attract foreign 
and local investment. Thus, the current 
approach favored by Sisi – i.e., the imple-
mentation of development projects under 
military supervision, only involving the 
private sector as subcontractors – is not sus-
tainable. 
As a matter of fact, the relationship be-
tween Sisi and the business tycoons has not 
been that smooth, as the latter have been 
losing some of the privileges they enjoyed 
under Mubarak. During his first month in 
office, Sisi made a number of harsh eco-
nomic decisions. For the first time since 
2007, fuel prices were raised during the 
current fiscal year in order to reduce ener-
gy subsidies by 40 billion EGP (US$ 5.6 bil-
lion). Without doubt, energy-intensive 
industries (such as cement, fertilizers, iron, 
and steel) run by the private sector were 
the first affected by the reduction in energy 
subsidies. In addition, Sisi issued a law 
amending the tax code to apply a ten per-
cent tax on stock market proceeds as well 
as a five percent tax on incomes that exceed 
one million EGP (US$ 140,000) a year (over 
the next three years). 
Though private businesses have not 
voiced opposition to these recent tax hikes 
and the reduction in energy subsidies, they 
will be more likely to resist the implemen-
tation of progressive taxes (as stipulated by 
article 38 of the 2014 constitution and cur-
rently under discussion) and the setting of 
minimum and maximum wages in the pri-
vate sector – a measure that already entered 
into force in July 2014 for civil servants.  
A sign of the disenchantment from big 
business is the business elites’ slow response 
to Sisi’s call to make donations to a newly 
established public fund called “Tahiyya 
Misr” (Long Live Egypt) in order to finance 
the national development projects. In mid-
July 2014, Sisi invited 50 businessmen to 
a meeting in which he managed to collect 
more than five billion EGP (US$ 700 mil-
lion) from a number of business tycoons. 
Still, businesspeople have abstained from 
donating substantial sums to the fund –
contributions have remained far below 
Sisi’s original target of 100 billion EGP 
(US$ 14 billion). The businessmen invited 
to attend this meeting include independent 
or opposition-linked businessmen (such as 
Naguib Sawiris), former members of Mu-
barak’s National Democratic Party (such as 
Mohamed Farid Khamis), and former mem-
bers of the Brotherhood-linked Egyptian 
Business Development Association (such as 
Safwan Thabet). This is a clear indicator 
that Egypt’s new regime is willing to co-
operate with all businessmen, regardless 
of their political backgrounds, except for 
Gamal Mubarak’s business cronies (such as 
steel-magnate Ahmed ‘Ezz), as Sisi does not 
want to be associated with the Mubarak re-
gime’s corrupt practices. 
Sooner or later, Sisi will have to define 
new rules of the game governing access to 
assets and to economic opportunities. He 
needs the private sector’s involvement in 
the economy (through local investment and 
tax payments) in order to ensure the long-
term economic recovery he is yearning for, 
and thus to consolidate his own legitimacy.  
Islamist Forces: Quest for Survival 
The ouster of then President Morsi signaled 
the beginning of a state crackdown on the 
Muslim Brotherhood. By the end of Septem-
ber 2013, the organization was banned by 
court ruling, its main figures arrested, its 
assets confiscated, and those of its leaders 
frozen. The organization was also declared 
a “terrorist” organization by the Egyptian 
government in December 2013. In August 
2014, almost one year after the Brother-
hood’s ban, its political wing, the Freedom 
and Justice Party, was dissolved by another 
court ruling. 
Ahead of the protests starting at the end 
of June 2013, calling for Morsi’s resigna-
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 tion, Brotherhood leaders – along with 
leaders of other Islamist parties and move-
ments – formed the National Alliance to 
Support Legitimacy, later also known as the 
Anti-Coup Alliance. Today, this alliance has 
been weakened following the withdrawal 
of some of its key members, namely the al-
Wasat and al-Watan parties. This has left 
the Brotherhood – as well as the other 
members of the Anti-Coup Alliance – in a 
dire situation. The release of two moderate 
Muslim Brotherhood figures (Helmi al-Gaz-
zar and Mohamed al-Omda) in September 
2014 revived the discussion about a possi-
ble reconciliation between the new leader-
ship and Brotherhood members who are 
willing to undertake an “ideological revi-
sion.” It is clear that any reintegration into 
the political system would be on the re-
gime’s terms and would mean respecting 
the military’s red lines on national security 
and Egyptian national identity. At the same 
time, any reconciliation would deal a fatal 
blow to the Brotherhood’s organizational 
unity and its leaders’ credibility in view 
of the brutal crackdown that has left hun-
dreds of its supporters dead and many 
more arrested. 
The Salafist Nour party can be consid-
ered as the one benefiting from the Brother-
hood’s demise. Its leaders supported Morsi’s 
ouster, adopted the military-led transitional 
roadmap, and participated in the drafting 
of the 2014 constitution. Their contribution 
has been seen as providing “Islamic legiti-
macy” to the new political order. Al-Nour’s 
leaders justified their pragmatic stance as 
an effort to preserve national unity, to keep 
Islamists represented in the government, 
and to escape the Brotherhood’s fate. The 
leaders’ main concern has been to avoid a 
return to the pre-2011 situation, when they 
were being persecuted by State Security ser-
vices. They also worry about article 74 of 
the 2014 constitution, which states that “no 
political party can be based on religion.” 
If used against them by the current regime, 
this article may transform al-Nour into an 
illegal entity. Such a haunting fear explains 
why al-Nour endorsed Sisi as a presidential 
candidate, to the extent of organizing nine 
public meetings to call their followers to 
vote for him in the last presidential elec-
tions. For the moment, although al-Nour is 
still a necessary ally for legitimizing Sisi’s 
regime, the party has lost some of its cre-
dentials among its core Islamist supporters 
for what is seen as betraying its fellow Is-
lamists. Likewise, its organizational weak-
ness – following its internal divisions, which 
led to the splitting off and formation of 
the Salafist al-Watan party in January 2013 
– and its limited financial resources cast 
doubt on its capacity to replace the Brother-
hood as the main Islamist political force or 
to win the “Islamist vote” in the parliamen-
tary elections, which are officially supposed 
to take place before the end of 2014. Against 
this background, al-Nour leaders have 
started talks with the al-Wasat and al-Watan 
parties about forming an Islamist electoral 
coalition, or at least to convince figures 
of both parties to run for elections on al-
Nour’s list. 
Secular Political Forces: 
Yearning for Influence 
The participation of secular political forces 
in the June 2013 demonstrations under the 
banner of the National Salvation Front – 
an opposition alliance formed at the end 
of November 2012 – and their approval of 
the military-backed transitional roadmap, 
certainly legitimized the political process. 
However, this front collapsed after the oust-
er of President Morsi, and longstanding 
divisions among Egypt’s civilian politicians 
reemerged. In the same vein, prior to the 
May 2014 presidential elections, an internal 
split occurred within the ranks of 
Tamarrod (rebellion), a campaign launched 
by young activists in April 2013 calling for 
Morsi’s resignation. At least two of its lead-
ing figures supported Hamdeen Sabahi, 
whereas a large number of its members 
constituted the backbone of Sisi’s electoral 
campaign and have since strongly support-
ed the new government’s policies. 
Tamarrod is currently being transformed 
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 into a political party called the Arab 
Popular Movement, which could field 
candidates in the parliamentary elections. 
In an attempt to coordinate the efforts 
of national secular political forces, Amr 
Moussa – one of the presidential candidates 
in 2012 and head of the 50-member com-
mittee that wrote the 2014 constitution – 
conducted negotiations with right- and left-
wing parties to form a coalition. Yet, in 
early August 2014, Moussa’s negotiations 
with the political forces reached a deadlock 
due to some parties’ self-interested calcu-
lations and the unwillingness of others to 
include former members of Mubarak’s 
defunct National Democratic Party in any 
electoral coalition. At the same time, his 
initiative inspired others, which has led to 
three rather homogenous electoral coali-
tions among the secular forces. The first 
and most organized one is the liberal-
centrist Egyptian Wafd alliance. It mainly 
includes the Wafd party, led by business-
man al-Sayed al-Badawi; the Egyptian Social 
Democratic Party, led by Mohamed Abul-
Ghar; and the Reform and Development 
party, led by Mohamed Anwar al-Sadat. The 
second coalition is the left-centrist Demo-
cratic Alliance for Civil Forces. The major 
participating parties include the Popular 
Current, led by former presidential candi-
date Hamdeen Sabahi; the Dostour party, 
led by Hala Shukrallah; and the Socialist 
Popular Alliance, led by Abdel Ghaffar 
Shukr. The third one is the Egyptian Front, 
led by remnants of Mubarak’s regime. The 
latter sneaked into the public/political 
arena and have been smoothly rehabilitat-
ed since Morsi’s ouster. It mainly comprises 
the Misr Baladi party, led by Ahmed Gamal-
eddin, Interior Minister under Morsi; and 
the National Movement, led by Mubarak’s 
last Prime Minister and 2012 presidential 
candidate, Ahmed Shafiq. As for the Free 
Egyptians Party, founded by business ty-
coon Naguib Sawiris, it is still undecided 
whether it will join one of the first two 
coalitions or run for elections on its own.  
The success of these coalitions is quite 
uncertain, whether it is with regard to 
running for elections or forging political 
alliances that go beyond electoral strate-
gies. The involvement of secular political 
forces in politics remains important for the 
current regime’s image as being pluralist. 
However, their fragmentation and compe-
tition over leadership does not make them 
serious contenders for the current ruling 
coalition. 
In addition to the fragmentation of the 
secular political spectrum, the new election 
law issued in June 2014 will hinder the 
proper representation of political parties in 
the coming parliament. It provides for a 
mixed system when electing the parlia-
ment’s members. In addition to the 27 
members appointed by the President, the 
law gives a greater share for the majority 
vote system (420 members, or 74.1 percent 
of the seats) and a minority of seats (120 
members, or 21.2 percent of the seats) to 
be elected through a closed-list majority 
system. On the one hand, this law clearly 
favors well-connected, wealthy individuals 
and old, well-rooted and well-financed par-
ties. On the other hand, it voids the list 
system of meaning, as it does not allow for 
any proper proportional representation. 
According to the closed-list majority sys-
tem, the list receiving the majority of votes 
(50%+1) is awarded all seats. Moreover, the 
law establishes conditions for the lists’ 
composition, as each has to include a set 
number of specific groups (such as Chris-
tians, women, disabled persons, workers/ 
farmers, etc.). 
Thus, this law forces political parties to 
form electoral coalitions in order to run for 
the upcoming parliamentary elections. This 
poses the danger of leading to a weak par-
liament composed of fragile alliances, dom-
inated by well-connected businessmen, 
running as individual candidates, and con-
trolled by the executive. 
Outlook 
The consolidation of the post-July 2013 
order will depend on the leadership’s 
capacity to ensure political stability and 
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 economic recovery. This is supposed to be 
achieved in the short-term through direct 
state intervention to establish major infra-
structure and development projects. 
However, the partnership between the 
military and the business elites is faced 
with a number of challenges. Egyptian busi-
ness tycoons will not accept being reduced 
to subcontractors working under the mili-
tary’s supervision. Thus, a potential re-
evaluation of the military’s role in the eco-
nomy will be required in the medium and 
long-term. Sisi will have to persuade his 
core supporters in the military to make 
concessions to private businesses. He will 
also have to establish the new rules of the 
game defining access to assets, markets, 
and business opportunities, while at the 
same time improving the lot of the most 
deprived, as he has promised. For the mo-
ment, the new President’s popularity en-
ables him to adopt harsh economic mea-
sures. However, the absence of an efficient 
social welfare program (e.g., access to basic 
health services, to unemployment allow-
ance, etc.) with a capacity to alleviate the 
effects of austerity measures, which espe-
cially hurt the most vulnerable sections of 
the population, is likely to undermine the 
new regime’s legitimacy and put an end to 
the état de grâce it is currently enjoying. 
Germany and its European partners 
retain very limited influence on the Egyp-
tian political order, especially as today the 
latter mainly depends on Gulf financial 
assistance. Also, the application of political 
conditionality by European authorities has 
shown its limits. Still, while Sisi’s willing-
ness to participate in the international 
coalition against the so-called Islamic State 
is bolstering his international legitimacy, 
European governments should not ignore 
the Egyptian regime’s drift toward authori-
tarianism in return for fighting terrorism. 
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